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cisely state all the dilemmas produced by the interdisciplinary nature of
bioethics; (2) the specific values or ethical principles involved in the
situation must be stated clearly and precisely and ordered coherently;
(3) the positions adopted by the associations in which one has membership must be investigated.
S. states that "this book represents one part of the methodology
suggested in this chapter," namely, presentation of a variety of views on
a number of different topics which will stimulate the emergence of
different values that can be examined critically in relationship to one
another. Only then can an analysis of specific issues take place with a
view to drawing specific conclusions.
S.'s book is welcomed as an attempt to emphasize the religious-ethical
contribution to the bioethical analysis of medical-technological questions. It could serve as an upper-division or graduate reader. Its openness and perceptive choice of authors and articles are refreshing. However, as a R.C. religious-ethical methodological work, it should be
supplemented by articles such as Charles E. Curran's "Present State of
Moral Theology," TS 34 (1973) 446-67, and Daniel Maguire's chapter
"Ethics: How to Do It," in his Death by Choice (1975).
John Carroll University, Cleveland

GEORGE A. KANOTI

DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: OUR LAST QUEST
FOR RESPONSIBILITY. By Robert M. Veatch. New Haven: Yale Univ.

Press, 1976. Pp. 323. $12.95.
V. has added a valuable volume to the burgeoning literature on the
ethical and policy questions related to death and dying. It is V.'s belief
that "the best hope for gaining insight into the complex dilemmas posed
by the technological and biological revolutions is an eclectic spirit
combining contributions from many disciplines." In this spirit he considers the moral meaning of death, the definition of death, the choice not to
prolong dying, the right to refuse treatment, and the policy issues
related to all of this. He also discusses the patient's right to have the
truth, and the moral and policy issues regarding the newly dead. V.
states that his book is not primarily "a philosophical analysis of the
ethics of death and dying," and this is somewhat true in view of the
broad interdisciplinary range of the work. Still, he does develop some
significant ideas in a way that is enriching to ethical theory.
For example, V. appreciates that the death question is foundational,
that it poses anew the question of the meaning of the good life, since to
ask the meaning of death draws us into the question of the meaning of
life. He accosts the still regnant illusions of value-free science and is
effective in showing the philosophical and theological judgments and
values implicit in supposedly detached empirical analyses. He is also
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good in elucidating the crucial ethical considerations involved in the
doctor's decision regarding what the patient should be told. V. is not
overawed by "the technological priesthood." In this and in other ways,
V. illustrates two of the promising advantages of the current rush to
bioethics: first, it can draw the ethicist to the foundations of ethical
theory where his major contributions are due, and secondly, bioethics is
constructing paradigms for the other hard and soft sciences which can
aid them in investigating the value-laden content of their disciplines
and in demonstrating their inherent need for inclusion in ethical discourse. Bioethics betrays its promise when it remains an issue-hopping
exercise which eschews theoretical depth. There are other strengths in
V.'s book: his analysis of the ordinary/extraordinary-means distinction
is telling; he is strong on stressing the centrality of the patient's all-tooneglected interests; his proposed statute regarding the determination
that a person has died advances that discussion; and his bibliographical
richness regarding all issues treated is one of the decided values of the
book.
I would take issue at some points. V. allows that there may be "rare
cases where active killing of the dying might be morally justified." He
also suggests that "we may want active killing of dying patients to
remain illegal even in those rare cases where it might be morally
justified." These positions, which are not self-evident, need more development than they are given. Indeed, the view that the instances of
moral mercy death should be handled preterlegally seems to me a thesis
that will not stand. V. concedes too much to the contention of the
medical priesthood that "pain and suffering can virtually always be
controlled." There are important differences between pain and suffering, and radical limits in the control of medicine over the latter. This
distinction is often, as here, missed. V. finds it hard to see why there
should be any moral distinction between stopping a treatment once
started, and failing to start it in the first place. That distinction may,
however, be defended on the critical grounds of the moral significance of
consequences, both psychological and social. Valid distinctions are
based on differences, and there are differences here. V. is also not on
good ground when he speaks of the use of "probable opinion," probabiliorism, and tutiorism in deciding cases where "there is moral or philosophical doubt about whether someone is dead." These systems in
Catholic moral thought were not developed to address questions of
doubtful fact but only of doubtful liceity. Also, it is not correct to say
that the "Roman Catholic Church stands firm" on the position that
direct termination of innocent life is always morally wrong. The Roman
Catholic Church is not theologically monolithic on this at this time;
there are solidly probable alternatives to the older view. With all of this
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said, however, V.'s book should be seen as a strong and significant
contribution.
Marquette University

DANIEL C. MAGUIRE

SOCIAL JUSTICE. By David Miller. Oxford: Clarendon, 1976. Pp. 367.
$19.75.
This is an important and interesting book which suggests new lines of
inquiry for political theorists, moral philosophers, intellectual histo
rians, sociologists, and those who care to think seriously about issues of
social justice. It represents a sustained effort to achieve a marriage
between linguistic analysis and historical sociology. It is also, largely
because of the ambition and scope that make it valuable, a disappoint
ing book.
After an introduction mainly given over to the methodology of politi
cal theory, which M. regards as involving both conceptual analysis and
an empirically based view of society, M. offers a preliminary account of
the concept of social justice, which (unlike Rawls) takes just states of
affairs rather than just institutions or procedures as fundamental. M.
holds that social justice is a distributive notion applying to burdens and
benefits and that Rawls's first principle of equal liberty is relevant to
political and legal justice, but not to social justice. He argues that both
utilitarianism and Rawls's contract theory fail to meet demands of our
ordinary concept of social justice.
M. holds that there are in our notion of justice three distinct and
conflicting principles: rights, desert, and needs. He devotes a chapter to
the analysis of each, stressing the limited yet indeterminate character of
each principle. The notion of rights brings us to "a legalistic area of
morality" (56), and M. understands moral rights by analogy with legal
rights (48). Rights arise from specific actions of persons (61), and they
specify what is due to persons; they contribute to the security and
freedom of persons in society (71). M. distinguishes between positive
rights, which are socially or legally recognized, and ideal rights, which
"are best analyzed in terms of the concepts of desert and need" (78).
M. holds that judgments of desert are always moral judgments (76)
and fall under ideal justice (91), but that judgments of desert relevant to
distribution rarely concern moral qualities of persons. Thus the two
main bases of economic desert are contribution and effort. The main
difficulty with desert as the basis of social justice is in finding clear
criteria for applying the notion (120).
M. analyzes the notion of need thus: " Ά needs X' = fA will suffer
harm if he lacks X' " (130). Harm is to be understood in relation to a

